Is there a sovereignty problem in the EU? by Saurugger, Sabine
Is there a sovereignty problem in the EU?
Sabine Saurugger
To cite this version:
Sabine Saurugger. Is there a sovereignty problem in the EU?. 2013. <halshs-00911482>
HAL Id: halshs-00911482
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00911482
Submitted on 29 Nov 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sciences Po Grenoble  
working paper n.9 
 
 
 
Is there a sovereignty problem in the EU? 
 
Sabine Saurugger, Univ. Grenoble-Alpes, Sciences Po Grenoble, PACTE 
 
 
    November 2013 
 
 
 
 
Partners // 
 
      
 
 
 
 2 
 
Is there a sovereignty problem in the EU? 
 
Sabine Saurugger, Sciences Po Grenoble, IUF 
sabine.saurugger@sciencespo-grenoble.fr 
 
 
 
In the process of the European integration, the role of the state seems again to have 
become stronger over the last fifteen years: oppositions against treaty reforms were 
carried by national public opinions, framed by state borders; decisions with regard to 
rescue packages were decided on the basis of governmental debates and included much 
less than in the past supranational institutions.  
 
This contribution aims at analysing the challenges state sovereignty – newly affirmed and 
old – poses to theoretical approaches of European integration. It does so in two parts. It 
discusses the question of sovereignty in the regional integration schemes more generally in 
a first part. In distinguishing between internal and external state sovereignty, my aim is to 
consider sovereignty not so much as a juridical concept than as a concept whose 
importance varies according to perception and construction by social agents. A second 
part will then develop a conceptual framework based on the usage of sovereignty by 
members state officials both at the EU and the national level. 
 
 
 
Work in progress 
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Introduction1 
 
Theorizing the European Union entails a number of difficulties. Amongst those, and not 
the least important, is without doubt the question how to deal with the state in this 
process. More specifically: how to take one of the state’s core characteristics into 
account: its sovereignty?  
The analysis of sovereignty in the European Union is not a particularly new idea. Most 
commonly, federalist perspectives have dealt with this question extensively and 
abundantly (Beaud 2007, Burgess 2006, Howse and Nicolaïdis 2001 to quote but a few), 
both from a legal and political science perspective. Amongst politics approaches, liberal 
intergovernmentalism is without doubt the best-known perspective for giving state 
sovereignty the role of the central independent variable in explaining policy processes in 
the European Union (Moravcsik 1998). Is it therefore necessary to add any new element 
to this, rather comprehensive, debate?   
 
The aim of this article is not to develop a new conceptual framework to understand the 
sovereignty of the member states in the European Union (for such an attempt see Jessop 
2004), nor to propose a new theory of the state. My main objective is to show that, while 
it is impossible to analyse European integration without taking state sovereignty into 
account, it is also impossible to understand this sovereignty without taking into account 
the usage that actors make of this sovereignty (see also Aalberts 2012). In other words, 
it is necessary to deal with sovereignty in action.  
 
This contribution analyses the elements that enter into play when actors, both national 
as well as European, discursively refer to sovereignty in order to oppose or, on the 
contrary, to support European integration projects and policy processes more generally. 
Thus, my position is far from arguing normatively, as is common amongst eurosceptics, 
that European integration reduces state sovereignty, nor to put forward the idea that 
European integration has reinforced or transformed sovereignty over that last sixty 
years.  
 
                                                        
1 Paper prepared for the ECPR General conference, Bordeaux, September 2013  
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This article is based on the general assumption that the European Union is not a sui 
generis organisation in need of new theoretical approaches and theories. It is therefore 
not necessary to invent a new political, economic or law category in order to understand 
the place of sovereignty in European integration. Under no circumstances makes the 
European Union or the global system in general older theories developed to understand 
sovereignty obsolete.  
On the contrary, the article aims at arguing that European integration has neither 
transformed nor diminished state sovereignty. State sovereignty is not a static object. 
Instead of starting this article with a clear definition of sovereignty, as I would usually 
do, this article argues that it is a concept that only acquires existence through its use and 
the interpretation offered by actors. Albeit sovereignty is, without doubt, a legal 
principle, only the use of this concept allows us to perceive the forms it takes in real life. 
This reflexion is by no means revolutionary: the strategic usage of sovereignty exists 
since the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 (Aalberts 2012).  
The aim of this article is thus to understand when and how sovereignty is actively used 
in the European Union, given that we are indeed confronted with a multilevel 
governance system in which state power is distributed unequally between policy-
making levels. Political developments since the beginning of the European integration 
process, but in particular over the last twenty years – such as the debates surrounding 
immigration policies, the functioning of Economic and Monetary Union, the successive 
Treaty reforms, and the more and more politicised debates in the EU, make it necessary 
to analyse this issue anew. 
 
A first part of this article will concentrate on the theoretical and conceptual 
perspectives, which deal with the question of sovereignty in the European Union. From a 
critical analysis of these approaches, a second part will then develop a number of 
research perspectives to deal with usages of sovereignty in the European Union.  
 
 
1. Sovereignty in European Studies 
 
Schematically it is possible to distinguish between three specific perspectives dealing 
with sovereignty in the European Union. A first approach argues that state sovereignty 
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diminishes through EU membership, a second analyses the transformation of 
sovereignty through regional integration, and, a third, finally, discovers the 
disappearance of sovereignty as an object of study. 
 
 
– The disappearance of sovereignty as state attribute  
 
This specific feature in European studies finds its origins in Jean Bodin’s definition of 
sovereignty (Les six livres de la République): those who are sovereign can under no 
circumstances be subject of another authority. In international relation theories, this 
approach is at the origin of Kenneth Waltz’ neorealist theory (1979). In his 
understanding the State detains the capacity to decide, alone, how to deal with internal 
and external problems (external and internal sovereignty). Thus, if a State cannot 
assume his external and internal capacities, it has lost its sovereignty.  
This understanding reminds us of very exclusive definitions by legal theories of the 
state, such as Hans Kelsen or Raymond Carré de Malberg (1962). In this context, state 
sovereignty is defined the supremacy of state power. By definition, this understanding 
refuses any idea that there might be a power beyond the state. The political as well as 
legal supremacy of the state is thought as the constitutive power of the state, but also as 
its omnipotence and the power of the state to keep unshared state prerogatives (Beaud 
1994). As soon as a state shares these prerogatives, it loses its sovereignty. This absolute 
nature of sovereignty lead to an understanding of European integration as grave digger 
of state sovereignty. A member state of the European Union is no longer a sovereign 
state.  
Thus, sovereignty understood in this sense does not structure any longer interstate 
relations in the European Union. The double sovereignty of the state – internal and well 
as external disappears. Internal politics, organised to allow the state to exert his 
authority over state territory (hierarchy), and its foreign policy, based on the formal 
equality between governments (anarchy) and allowing the state to act without external 
constraints can’t be distinguished any longer.  
 
This line of arguing can be found in the assumption that the British, Danish or Swedish 
opt outs of some aspects of European integration such as the Schengen agreement, the 
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Economic and Monetary Union or the social charter could be seen as reaffirmations of 
state sovereignty that should not have taken place. These opt outs are seen as political 
contradictions with the principles of an ever closer Union, because an ever closer Union 
would lead to an implicit federal state in which state sovereignty so much as disappears 
(Curtin 1993, de Burca and Scott 2000).  
 
However, the European Union is not only an ever-closer Union. I t is also a composite 
space. This composite character entails a number of limits for a clear-cut distinction 
between a sovereign and a non-sovereign state:  
1. EU public policies are of different nature, either based on the classical community 
method, intergovernmental decision-making or the open method of coordination. 
The states thus can play with different interpretations of their sovereignty in 
different decision-making contexts. 
2. Even if EU norms are legally binding, states can circumvent or oppose these 
norms. They are thus free to renegotiate the rules defined by the Economic and 
Monetary Union as well as those provided by Justice and Home Affairs policies in 
the framework of intergovernmental negotiations.  
3. Finally, the introduction of the Open Method of Coordination, introduced in 2000 
to allow the Union to deepen harmonisation of social and employment policies 
must be seen as an enlargement of potential tools to play with state sovereignty. 
This method has been transferred also to other policy fields. Several policy areas 
such as environmental policy, based on programmes as well as public and private 
partnerships (Halpern 2010, Holzinger, Knill and Shafer 2006, Jordan, Wurzel 
and Zito 2003), regional policy (Bache 2010), or security (Balzacq 2008) or 
foreign and defense policy (Menon and Sedelmeier 2010) have equally developed 
non-legally binding policy tools, often without the perimeter of the open method. 
One of the objectives of the Open Method of coordination is to avoid direct 
resistance of member states, but to allow for further deepening integration in 
certain areas through a method mainly based on a learning process. This method 
would make the circumvention or the opposition of member states to existing 
rules less visible. In this debate, state sovereignty would be entirely maintained 
because no legal constraint, leading to a control by a supranational court – in our 
case the European Court of Justice – would be used as a threat.  
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– The transformation of state sovereignty 
 
A second group of scholars assumes that state sovereignty is only transformed through 
European integration. They argue that the European Union can simply not be treated 
without taking into account the intergovernmental character of the European Union. 
State sovereignty is a central feature of regional integration, according to these scholars. 
However, there are not a static fact, but a notion, transformed and retransformed 
through interaction.  
 
Thus, the European Union is characterised as neo-medieval structure (Bull 1977, 
Waever 1995, de Wilde and Wieberg 1996) or post-modernist structure, based on « post 
sovereignty», « late sovereignty », « conflictual sovereignty», « competition sovereignty» 
or  «mixed sovereignty » (Delanty and Rumford, 2006; McCormick 2002; Bellamy and 
Castiglioni 2002). Its features are overlapping authority centres and multiple loyalties 
(Bull 1977, Zielonka 2006)2. A similar interpretation is offered by Marlene Wind’s 
analysis of sovereignty and law in the EU. Based on the idea of the EU as a polycentric 
community as proposed by Neil MacCormick (2002), she argues that the EU either 
already is (in legal terms at least) beyond sovereignty and therefore post-Hobbesian, or 
at least it will become so in the near future. What she means by post-Hobbesian is that 
the EU would be beyond the ´well-known Hobbesian dogma that for order to exist there 
must be a hierarchical coercive structure to keep man in awe´ (Wind 2001, 80). 
This is referred to as ‘pooled sovereignty’, negotiated by a large number of actors and 
their committees and controlled by the authority of regulations and judgements of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). Thus, most theoretical and conceptual approaches 
reject specific analytical tools of international relations when studying the European 
integration process, arguing that the conceptual tools used to study the State are 
                                                        
2
 In his study, Zielonka presents a fundamentally different view from that advocated by researchers who analyse the 
integration process in terms of constructing a Westphalian state or a sui generic formation. Conversely, the author offers an 
analogy between the European Union and a neo-medieval empire, where the European Union acts as a meta-governor 
(p.190), acting as the mediator between a complex network of independent levels of governance, territorial units and 
democratic political blocks. This conceptualisation enables a position to be resolutely taken against static analyses of 
integration, only concerned with small-scale micro-sociological policy phenomena. 
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sufficient to fully understand the integration process in all its complexity (Hurrell and 
Menon 1996, 2003).  
Sovereignty must thus be conceptualised not as a zero-sum game but as a dual concept: 
The state and the European Union possess both forms of sovereignty which are 
transformed though interaction and are constantly reinterpreted (Herschinger et al 
2011). It is this understanding of sovereignty that is also at the heart of the idea 
developed in the second part of this paper: sovereignty can only be understood if we 
concentrate on the interpretation provided by the actors themselves. 
However, albeit stimulating, this interpretation also seems to assume that there was 
such a thing as a golden age of state sovereignty. A period where neither globalisation, 
nor regional integration, nor internal debates questioned the sovereignty of the state. 
This however, is an assumption, this article does not share.  
 
– The disappearance of state sovereignty as an object of study 
 
Since the 1990s, theoretical and conceptual approaches have increased their 
explanatory capacities by adopting a ‘mainstreaming’ attitude. Thus, tools developed by 
public policy and comparative politics approaches, sociology and political theory used as 
theoretical and conceptual approaches to European integration have helped to minimise 
the exceptional nature of the process and allowed to compare the EU construction 
process with other political phenomena associated with the state. One of the 
implications of these European studies is that the European integration processes can 
no longer be understood by international relations analyses alone, the idea being that 
international relations approaches are primarily interested in inter-state or inter-
governmental relations (Hix 1994, Pierson 1996, Pollack 2005). 
 
It is in particular the theoretical framework of multilevel governance that allowed from 
the beginning of the 1990s onwards to understand the policy-making dynamics that 
took place in the EU after the Single European Act of 1987 and the Maastricht Treaty of 
1992. The essence of MLG thus seems to describe « a system of continuous negotiations 
among nested governments at several territorial tiers (Marks 1993, 392). This system of 
negotiations, according to the same author, gives rise to arrangements in which 
« supranational, national, regional and local governments are enmeshed in territorially 
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overarching policy networks » (ibid. 402-403). This means that institutions are 
constantly adjusted and procedures are constantly tinkered with by the decision-making 
process themselves. Considered to be ‘compelling metaphore’, because of its perceived 
theoretical neutrality (Rosamond 2000), MLG considers the state to be under a three-
fold pressure: from above, through other international organisations and norms, from 
below, through sub-state actors, such as regions or cities, and from within, through non-
state actors such as interest groups or social movements. MLG sis a catch-all phrase that 
indicates phenomena that tale place at the level of politics (political mobilization), polity 
(state structures) and policy (policy-making arrangements). It describes two 
interrelated features. One the one hand there seems to occur an increasing territorial 
disarticulation of central states that can be seen through phenomena such as 
deconcentration, regionalisation, devolution and federalisation. On the other there is an 
increasing involvement of private or semi-public actors in policy-making activities.  
Four general propositions summarize MLG main features (Piattoni 2010, 249). First, 
MLG argues that whenever the scale of political or economic activity is expanded from 
the sub-state to the European level, a qualitative change occurs to the actors that get 
mobilized at these levels. Second, the public-private dichotomy gets blurred when 
private actors acquire a public function, a phenomenon well known in the 
neocorporatist literature since the 1970s. Third, these transformations do not take place 
by chance but are actively searched for and put in place by actors. For instance by acting 
as ‘private’ interests, certain authorities can mobilize at levels, which are not 
contemplated within the existing institutional order. This blurring of dichotomies is thus 
not an accident but « driven by the agency of actors that find that the redefinition and 
simultaneous activation of these levels is a way to strengthen their own position and to 
pursue goals or defend positions that they consider important and legitimate » (249). 
Fourth, and last, MLG does not only consider the blurring of the public-private 
dichotomy, but also that of subnational-supranational distinctions and that of the 
domestic-international dichotomy.  
While these features describe a large number of elements on which the EU political 
system is based, they evacuate and ignore the still important influence of state 
sovereignty. Attempts have been made, though, to link MLG to sovereignty schemes. 
These theoretical perspectives consider sovereignty either as an implicit or as an 
explicit aspect that must be taken into account in the theoretical reflexion. With regard 
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to the implicit aspect, Schimmelfennig, Rittberger and Leuffen (2012) further develop 
the notion of differentiated integration that emerged in the 1990 (for a review see 
Walker 1998).  In stating that there has been a growing challenge to the principle of 
uniformity in the development of law and the institutions of the European Union, they 
implicitly argue that sovereignty became an issue after the Single European Act and the 
Maastricht Treaty, as the numbers of differentiated policy areas increased from 0 to 7% 
in 2010. While these authors, however, consider state sovereignty as one of the many 
aspects that must be taken into account when reforming the perspective of multi-level 
governance into what they call a theory of differentiated integration, other scholars 
close to a multi-level understanding of the EU have taken sovereignty explicitly into 
account. 
Amongst those, Neil Walker (1998) most explicitly analyses the relationship between 
sovereignty and differentiated integration in the European system of policy making. He 
argues that the concept of sovereignty has sufficient analytical scope to be capable of 
illuminating more or less complex configurations of authority. Very close to 
constructivist accounts of the concept, discussed below, Walker starts from the 
assumption that the virtue of a legal threshold definition of sovereignty ‘lies in the fact 
that it retains the sense of ultimate and categorical authority without imposing the 
impossible standards of absolutism’ (Walker 1998, 358). HIs understanding of 
differentiated integration is based on the idea that state sovereignty influences the 
functioning of the EU political system more than any other factor. His definition of 
sovereignty as an idea does not lead to the well-known state-level/supranational level 
dichotomy, but allows for understanding another conceptualisation of the EU. Indeed, 
here, the EU is not a simple, undisputed legal order within a particular political space, 
but an entity in which exist various, and perhaps mutually disputed legal orders within a 
particular political space (Walker 1998, 361);  
 
Except for Neil Walker’s understanding, this new conceptual frameworks which 
compare the functioning of the European Union as if it were a state. However, focusing 
on approaches developed to study the state (‘bottom-up mainstreaming’) neglects the 
fact that a number of European integration phenomena take place at an 
intergovernmental level and refer to concepts such as sovereignty, national interests or 
the framing power of national political and economic structures more generally. 
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Member states continue to represent the institutional and cognitive reference that push 
the process forward or, conversely, cause the European integration process to stagnate. 
Furthermore, some of the processes occurring within the European Union cannot be 
understood without considering the environment in which they operate, including 
processes of globalisation, the creation of norms by other international organisations 
that influence the European Union, or comparisons between different regional bodies. 
These phenomena, however, cannot entirely be captured by mainstreaming approaches 
which have the study of the state as starting point. Conceptual frameworks stemming 
from international relations seem better suited to explain issues referring to the role of 
the EU as an international actor, the influence European integration has on third 
countries or the role of sovereignty in intergovernmental negotiations taking place in 
the EU arena.  
This has be formulated by Stanley Hoffmann in the following terms : ‘[The state’s] 
autonomy is either denied (the state thus becoming a mere receptacle and by-product), 
or limited to whatever is functionally necessary to defend the social order (the state as 
the guardian of the higher or long-term interest of the dominant class); or else the state 
is being reduced to a set of institutions somewhat decoupled from the rest of the society, 
yet still analyzed primarily as the target or victim of social forces (the besieged state). … 
The theory overlooked the differential impact3 on the various nations, of external 
countries (such as the two superpowers). Moreover it underestimated the ability of the 
actors, especially the major ones, to stage or slow down the building of a central political 
system (the role of counter-ideas, if you like) and the ability of national bureaucracies to 
resist the transfer of power to the new central one (the power of inertia). (Hoffmann, 
1995, p.215-219)’. 
 
We find in Hoffmann’s quote the limits of an analysis that sees in the European Union, 
implicitely at least, the emergence of a new or quasi state. Whilst the premises of the 
mainstreaming shift are largely pertinent, insofar as they allow for conceptualizing the 
European Union not as a sui generis phenomenon but as a set of political and policy 
processes that can be compared to those taking place inside a state, they do bring a 
major challenge. By almost systematically omitting the intergovernmental nature of 
European integration, they make it practically impossible to reflect on an increased 
                                                        
3
 My italics 
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integration of the European continent, the relative respect of national sovereignties that 
we still find when analysing negotiations within the European Council and Council of 
ministers of the European Union (Puetter 2012), as well as to conceptualise the role of 
the EU beyond European borders.  
And yet, the European Union lies somewhere between an international system, which is 
different from the national system because its forms of regulation are imperfect and it 
has no political authority that overrides that of its members, and the State which, for the 
most part, has domestically legitimate power, however disputed that power might be 
(Alberts 2004, 2012). The question is: can the integration process be understood if the 
role of the intergovernmental characteristics of European integration is ignored and if 
sovereignty is to be ‘pooled’ away? 
 
This paper aims to take a different look at the intergovernmental nature of the 
integration process, whilst showing how this understanding does not focus exclusively 
on the ‘international’ topics of European integration, such as foreign policy and common 
foreign and security policy (CFSP) and foreign trade relations. Indeed, the purpose of 
this chapter is to consider the intergovernmental nature of European integration in its 
largest sense. Accepting this idea however does not necessarily mean returning to neo-
realists’ conceptual tools and the premise of the centrality of the State in an anarchical 
global system.  
The argument of this paper is somewhat different: I argue that state sovereignty is a 
resource that is used by states in a game of power and influence. Sovereignty is a 
strategic resource in national as well as international negotiations.  
 
 
 
2. Conceptualising sovereignty in European integration 
 
The re-composition of the state is a process pointed out and analysed by a large number 
of scholars (Le Galès and King 2011; Genschel and Zangl 2007). While this process exists 
and can be linked in international relations to what is called the ‘denationalisation of the 
state’ (Genschel and Zangl 2007), it does not question the state’s sheer existence. 
European states continue to have considerable resources to provide for public order, 
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defence and diplomacy. This, however, is not enough to understand the power and the 
influence a state has in European integration. The material attributes of a state do not 
systematically help us to analyse the role of the state in European integration: both its 
influence compared to that of European institutions and other actors and the role it 
plays in framing the debates at EU level. In order to capture the role of the state, we 
must analyse the states’ action at the international level through its agents, but also 
through the ideas and myths promoted by those same agents or as Skinner argues, the 
idea of the state “in context” (see also Skinner 2009; Aalberts 2004, Adler-Nissen 2008, 
2009).  
 
Yet, at the same time, this reading remains too general, or even banal. Sovereignty is, 
without doubt a social construct, but a social construct that gives the agents that uses 
this notion a position of authority. Thus, sovereignty becomes a institutional fact to 
understand the structure of power in European integration (Walker 2003). Sovereignty 
is maintained as an existential value of political and legal life and becomes visible 
through practice. Political interaction produced meaning of the notion of sovereignty 
and becomes thus a reality that matters (Adler Nissen and Gammeltoft Hansen 2008, 
Jackson 1993). 
 
This assumption leads to the hypothesis of this paper: sovereignty does not disappear 
with the deepening of European integration. As studies on differential integration show, 
individual EU member states have regularly opted-out from common rules, and non-EU 
member states have occasionally accepted EU obligations (Leuffen et al 2012). The 
‘implementation’ of sovereignty takes new and innovative forms: states play sovereignty 
games, as Adler-Nissen and Gammeltoft-Hansen (2008) have so pointedly underlined.  
Thus it is not sovereignty that is new, but its usages. States use new sovereignty 
strategies and thus modify their own understanding of sovereignty. 
 
To understand these usages and sovereignty strategies, we will not concentrate on IR 
objects alone, such as CFSP or external commercial policies. On the contrary, the aim of 
this article is to take the intergovernmental character of European integration seriously, 
without returning to the conceptual framework of realist or liberal intergovernmentalist 
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accounts which place the state in the centre of integration processes or the anarchical 
international system. 
 
This subsection will analyse the question of sovereignty in European integration in three 
parts. A first part reflects on the structuring role of the state. This part aims at 
illustrating that state sovereignty has not disappeared: its structuring role is crucial for 
understanding the activities of other agents. A second part will then present the tools 
that help us to conceptualise the usage of sovereignty in European integration. A third 
and last part will illustrate these usages through a number of case studies.   
 
 
1. The structuring role of the state  
 
Amongst the first constructivist studies on the role of the state in international affairs is 
Martha Finnemore’s (1996) research on national interests in international society. Her 
approach goes beyond the opposition between ideas and interests and develops a 
conceptual framework to help us understand the interests and attitudes of states by 
analysing international structures through meanings and social values. States are part of 
transnational and international relational networks, which form state actors’ 
perceptions of the world and shape the role these actors play. According to Finnemore, 
in the international context, states are socialised to defend certain interests and not 
others. The interests of governmental representatives are constructed through social 
interaction. Thus, far from being static, interests and values supported by international 
actors change in what are shifting normative contexts. This normative construction is 
greatly influenced by power games between the actors involved. Like Finnemore, Judith 
Goldstein and Robert Keohane (1995, 13) argue that norms and ideas4 can be 
institutionalised as well as instrumentalised, thus reflecting the power of certain ideas 
and the interests of the powerful: ‘These social structures may supply states with 
preferences and strategies for pursuing these preferences’. Similarly, Stephen Krasner 
(1993) argues that the origins of the international system show that certain norms or 
institutions – not unlike sovereignty – were initially institutionalised because they 
                                                        
4
 The difference between ideas and norms is generally under-developed by the analyses cited. However, Martha Finnemore 
is more in favour  of the sociological institutionalism movement than Goldstein and Keohane which defines norms as formal 
institutions (constitutions, norms, laws) and informal ones (methods, rituals).  
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served the interests of powerful actors, but have since become independent of those 
interests. 
Several factors influence changes in the norms guiding the actions of actors, including, 
the legitimacy sought and expertise provided by these same individuals (Haas 1990, 
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Numerous studies on the European Union have implicitly 
or explicitly returned to this hypothesis. Applied to another empirical study, namely the 
World Bank, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink show that expertise: 
 
‘usually resides in professionals, and a number of studies document the ways that 
professional training of bureaucrats in these organizations helps or blocks the 
promotion of new norms within standing organizations […] Studies of the World 
Bank similarly document a strong role for professional training in filtering the 
norms that the bank promotes. In this case, the inability to quantify many costs 
and benefits associated with antipoverty and basic human need norms created 
resistance among the many economists staffing in the bank, because projects 
promoting these norms could not be justified on the basis of “good economics”’ 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 899-900).  
 
Similarly, Nicolas Jabko shows that the divergence between actors seeking to promote 
the domestic market through different instruments must be seen as a resource for those 
actors seeking to reform the European system in the 1980s. Jabko’s premise is that 
‘these tensions are very important for understanding institutional change, because they 
represent opportunities for reform-seeking actors. The existence of tensions creates 
room for the emergence of political strategies and, ultimately, for institutional change’ 
(Jabko 2006). 
 
However, as Fritz Scharpf (2002) argues, it is also important to take account of the fact 
that certain political domains are, not surprisingly, much more difficult to integrate than 
others due to differing national interests. He enumerates the factors that have an impact 
on the national and European ability to solve public problems in different sectors of 
public policy. Having sequenced all sectors of public policy, it transpires that the areas 
least likely to achieve unanimity at European level are tax harmonisation, budget and 
certain areas of social policy. Any attempt at regulation in these domains comes up 
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against coalitions of divergent national interests, making it impossible to achieve broad 
agreement on common European rules. The author observes that: 
 
‘over recent years (…), the European Council has increasingly often bypassed the 
Commission’s prerogatives in law-making by defining certain elements of the 
European political calendar during its summer meetings – elements which must 
then be developed through legislative channels or ad hoc intergovernmental 
arrangements. In all these instances, national governments can use their veto if 
they need to fiercely defend their narrow or short-term national (or economic) 
interests, or indeed common European interests or derive longer-term benefits 
from enhanced political cooperation and coordination’ (Scharpf 2002, 615-616). 
 
To succeed, however, these countries must find a way of protecting democratic 
legitimacy, even if some of the above-mentioned adjustments come up against well-
established interests. Thus, the national interest is not pre-determined; rather, it comes 
about through interaction and is presented as such during intergovernmental 
negotiations. The national interest, defended in the name of state sovereignty at the 
European level, is considered by sociological approaches as an institution: ‘Even our 
most enduring institutions are based on collective understandings,[…] they are reified 
structures that were once upon a time conceived ex nihilo by human consciousness […] 
[which] were subsequently diffused and consolidated until they were taken for granted’ 
(Adler 1997, 322). Furthermore, in countries where institutions are fragmented and 
thus offer a large number of veto points, a successful change of political strategy 
requires a convergence of cognitive and normative orientations. 
Tackling the interests of actors or nations using the sociological tools of international 
relations, allows the dynamics of, and opposition to, European integration to be 
interpreted. Hence, an interest becomes a social construct, just like a national interest – 
which leads us to Wendtian reflection on the construction of anarchy in international 
relations (Wendt 1999). The analyses of the effects of European norms take us even 
further, to some extent abolishing the distinction between the intergovernmental and 
domestic levels. 
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Sovereignty and power of the state in the EU 
 
Generally conceptualised as a set of capacities primarily beheld by the state, power is 
considered by sociological approaches of IR as a relation. This fits with the Weberian 
definition, where power is the capacity of an actor to encourage other actors to do what 
they would otherwise not do. Power, therefore, is not only a set of material capacities, 
but also idea-based capacities. It is profoundly relative and differentiated, according to 
historical periods and international actor constellations. Rather than being an all-
encompassing thing, power is broken down into a series of dominant positions in 
diverse political sectors. Thus, power is observed when an actor can switch easily from a 
dominant position in one sector to a dominant position in another (Berenskoetter and 
Williams 2007). Susan Strange (1988, 1996) suggests looking at power in four areas – 
military, research and development, production and commerce and finance. Joseph Nye 
(1995, 2004) adds the power of cultural and ideological influence (soft power), though 
not in the ineffectual sense, since, as the author points out, it can give rise to a potential 
instrument of domination (Bially Mattern 2005). This differentiation makes the notion 
of power more dynamic and renders it adaptable to various conflicts and bargaining 
situations. 
In the European integration context, it is arguably interesting to look at the power of 
states in broadening the notion of ‘national interest’. The bargaining power of states is 
regulated judicially by the weight of their vote. However, his often means academics 
resort to a rather sterile analysis comparing major and minor states. Sociological 
approaches, on the other hand, look more closely at those factors determining of states – 
factors that change depending on the negotiations in hand. Given that decisions are 
generally taken consensually, despite the qualified majority voting (QMV) rule, the 
capacity of countries to influence their partners may be based on an infinite number of 
factors depending on the political issues at stake. Thus, the risk of analysing the political 
power relationships of the European Union through rational choice tools is that the 
power of the European Union is being conceived of as an attribute of equal actors, that is 
states.  
It seems important, therefore, to look at how member state representatives in the 
European Union behave in negotiations arenas and forums. Jeffrey Lewis, in his work on 
the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) (Lewis 2000, 2005), analyses 
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the permanent representatives’ socialisation process within the Council. Here, the 
notion of national interest is addressed sociologically, confronting it with actual 
discourses and attitudes during intergovernmental committee negotiations and debates. 
Lewis argues that national representatives share the conviction that they can be more 
influential if they can come up with common solutions. This idea is shared by Uwe 
Puetter (2006) in his study on the Eurogroup, demonstrating how a small circle of 
senior decision-makers shapes European economic governance through a routinised 
informal policy dialogue. Likewise, Rebecca Adler-Nissen argues that ‘the very 
construction of a national position takes place as part of a struggle for distinction and 
dominance in a field where the stakes have already been defined’ (Adler-Nissen 2009, 
132). An example of this construction process can be found in the opt-outs of a number 
of member states, such as the British and Danish, who decided not to participate in 
European Monetary Union or cooperate in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. Yet, the 
‘consensus norm’ which exists in the European Union prevents Danish and British 
officials from being totally left out from European negotiations. These countries have 
nonetheless influenced EU legislation in these fields and thus continue to informally 
participate in exchanges on these issues.  
It is precisely in these contexts where we see how sovereignty is constructed, through 
the interaction of diplomats playing a particular role, but at the same time adjusting to 
outside pressures. In the sociological sense, sovereignty is understood as an historical 
concept and not as a timeless legal principle. It links authority, territory, population, and 
recognition in a unique way, and in a particular time (Biersteker and Weber 1996). In 
order to understand this social interaction, it is necessary to analyse both the 
transformation of the concept and the carriers of its meanings, i.e. actors, be they public 
or private. In other words: ‘It may be that the ‘speech-act’ of sovereignty is more 
complex to perform in an era of globalization and constitutional pluralism, yet it remains 
an essential political tool in constituting the functional national and international legal 
orders in which power politics are played out’ (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Adler Nissen 
2008, 7; Walker 2003, 19-25).  
Due to their heterogeneity and epistemological conception, sociological approaches to 
international relations propose a broad analytical framework to address the link 
between strength and power within the European Union insofar as they allow us to take 
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into account the discursive and not solely judicial criterion of state sovereignty as 
applied to EU negotiations (see also Walker 2003). 
 
 
2. Usages 
 
The concept of usages helps us to develop a framework to understand the role of 
sovereignty in the European Union. It leads to concentrate on the resources of and 
means employed by agents in European integration.  
The approach developed by Jacquot and Woll (2004, 2008, 2010) to understand national 
level change induced by European integration can be used to explain sovereignty games 
state actors play in more detail. In their approach, Sophie Jacquot and Cornelia Woll 
emphasise two dimensions of change: firstly, the role of actors in the practical 
translation of the effects of integration and, secondly, the qualification of reasons to 
account for actors’ actions – or more specifically, the interaction between the micro level 
of the actor and the macro level of institutions. The authors argue that actors can 
‘choose’ and ‘learn’ free from institutional pressures, but that any social action within 
the European integration process also requires an understanding of the environment 
and the context. To be able to act, actors need to be able to interpret European 
institutions themselves and comprehend / cope with the pressures that those 
institutions bring to bear on them. 
This understanding of change is extremely useful to understand the strategic usage of 
state sovereignty. This sociological approach implies looking more closely at the role of 
actors as they interact, and recognising the importance of their mediation. A sociological 
lens is required here because we are analysing how the actor and his interactive 
behaviour are constructed. Through their actions, individuals constitute the dynamics of 
adaptation, be it from a national context to a European context, and vice versa. More 
specifically, the idea is to study how actors manage to translate their social positioning 
(their institutional situation, interests, world view) and the structures that frame their 
practices into power and influence. 
 
The term usage, however, supposes voluntary action. Whatever the nature of 
opportunity (political, institutional, symbolic, financial), actors must seize it and 
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transform it into political practice. What makes this approach particularly interesting for 
the study of sovereignty is the observation that there can be conscious and deliberate 
action without the initial and final objective being identical, and without the final effects 
automatically being checked and controlled. 
 
Three types of usage can be distinguished. Firstly strategic usage, comprising the most 
commonly studied examples: actors use opportunities provided by the European Union 
to either side-step the national level or to illustrate at the national level that their 
sovereignty is still intact. Secondly, cognitive usage, is part of an interpretation and 
persuasion framework where sovereignty needs to be interpreted in order to become an 
element of political debate. Finally, legitimisation usage is where actors use EU politics 
as elements to legitimise or de-legitimise political decisions at the domestic level. 
 
Figure 1. Typology of usages5 
Cognitive usage: 
Interpretation of context 
and dissemination of ideas 
as vectors of persuasion 
Strategic usage: 
Transformation of political 
practices into resources for 
action 
Legitimation usage: 
European integration as a 
formal legitimation of 
public decisions 
Definition of solutions Decision-making processes Justification 
 
These three types of usage can be very usefully applied to the use of sovereignty – or 
sovereignty games – in the European Union.  
The cognitive usage of sovereignty refers to sovereignty as competence, a number of 
rights and obligations, which concern both subjects as well as decision makers in a 
political system. The strategic aspect of sovereignty can be understood as control or 
power of states over economic, political as well as symbolic domains of policy-making in 
the European Union. Finally, the legitimacy aspect refers to sovereignty as resource used 
by the state to defend a specific position at the European or international level, 
particularly visible since the emergence of the democratic deficit debate at the EU level.  
In order to capture the empirical usages of sovereignty, it is necessary to take two 
variables into account: the rules and agents of sovereignty. Rules or norms include 
legally binding rules, but also informal norms that structure the perception actors have 
                                                        
5
 Adapted from Jacquot and Woll, 2004, 20. 
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of sovereignty. The notion of agents of sovereignty refer to governmental 
representatives, speaking in the name of their government and can be heads of state, 
ministers, but also governmental experts in various sectors of public policy.   
 
 
Figure 2. Sovereignty usages in the European Union 
 Cognitive usage: 
Sovereignty as 
competence, a 
number of rights and 
obligations 
Strategic usage: 
Sovereignty as 
control or power of 
states over 
economic, political as 
well as symbolic 
domains of policy-
making 
Legitimation usage: 
Sovereignty as 
resource used by the 
state to defend a 
specific position at 
the European or 
international level (in 
particular since the 
emergence of the 
democracy debate 
Agents Government 
representatives 
National experts 
Government 
representatives 
National experts 
Government 
representatives 
Rules Legally binding rules 
Cognitive frames 
Legally binding rules 
Cognitive frames 
Legally binding rules 
Cognitive frames 
Level of usage European 
Domestic 
European Domestic 
European 
 
 
2. Usages of sovereignty in European integration  
In the European Union, sovereignty can be used at the same time at the domestic level to 
protect the autonomy of the state, and at the European level in order to reinforce the 
influence of the state. This ‘sovereignty game’ (Adler-Nissen and Gammeltoft-Hansen 
2008) is the basis of my main argument: the principle of sovereignty remains 
unchanged, it is at the heart of intergovernmental relations. It is its usage that changes, 
adapts itself und is constantly reinterpreted.  
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From a legal point of view, sovereignty was always a possible weapon to block or, on the 
contrary to reinforce European integration, particularly since the use of the French veto 
power during de Gaulle’s Empty Chair crisis, or the German chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
and the French president’s Giscard d’Estaing’s idea to establish a European Monetary 
System in 1979. However, from the Single European Act of 1987 onwards, there is 
evidence of new sovereignty arrangements that allow for its flexible use. Thus Article 
100a (4) of the EC Treaty allows Member States to opt out of single market 
harmonisation measures ‘on grounds of major needs’ relating to public morality, public 
policy, public security, public health, protection of the natural environment and the 
working environment, and a range of other public interest grounds. The 1992 
Maastricht Treaty develops the theme of sectoral flexibility. Alongside the narrow ‘case 
by case ‘ flexibility exemplified by Article 100a(4), two other forms of flexibility are 
introduced: ‘predetermined flexibility’, where an area of flexibility is defined in advance; 
and ‘enhanced cooperation’, where Member States are empowered to make their own 
additional cooperative arrangements over a broad policy spectrum.  
 
A comparison of these opt-outs illustrates these how states use their sovereignty (Adler-
Nissen 2008, Walker 1998). During the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty, the UK and 
the Danish governments refused to participate in the Economic and Monetary Union as 
well as in Justice and Home Affairs. These opt-outs had two functions at the domestic 
level: they created on the one hand an image of national unity and established the idea 
of a unified public space despite the disagreements that exist in other domains. These 
positions allowed perceiving the state as an entity, which exercised a political-legal 
authority over its population, its territory and its money. On the other, these opt outs 
presented sovereignty as a state attribute, which cannot be removed. These 
understandings of sovereignty clearly refer to a legitimation usage in a strategic context.  
In the field of Justice and Home Affairs, the UK negotiated an opt-out, with some 
possibilities for partial and temporal opt-ins. This allowed the government to maintain 
the control of its borders and to develop and later implement its own immigration 
policy.  The Danish government, however, only decided to use the opt-out recognised by 
the Maastricht Treaty from 2001 onwards, when the liberal conservative government 
came to power. This new government replaced the Danish immigration policies, which 
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figured amongst the most liberal in Europe through a stricter and more severe asylum 
and immigration policy than could be found in other member states.  
At the EU level, the Ministers of Home Affairs, however, participated and cooperated 
systematically in negotiations concerning JHA.  The participation remained confined to 
the ministerial level. The population was not informed as it was perceived to be hostile 
to any European cooperation in this field.  The Danish government, who had no legal 
possibility to join its European partners contrary to the British government, negotiated 
individual and bilateral agreements with the Commission. This allowed the government, 
at the same time, to use its sovereignty as a legitimation tool vis-à-vis its population 
(‘see, we do not participate in this policy and are thus totally sovereign in this matter’), 
and to play a cooperation game vis-à-vis its European partners, while sometimes 
referring to sovereignty as a strategic tool (‘here we will not continue to cooperate as 
these dispositions are contrary to our independence’). 
 
The implementation of the Stability Pact is yet another illustration where sovereignty 
games are played.  The norms of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), albeit precise, 
were interpreted rather freely by a number of member states. Several targets of the SGP 
were indicative only (Hallerberg 2010). If a member state run a budget deficit in the 
medium term, the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) could issue a 
recommendation for corrective action. The member state, however, could not be 
excluded from EMU; it was not subject to a pecuniary fine, nor was under a legal 
obligation to follow the recommendation (Hodson and Maher 2004: 799). This flexible 
interpretation of the Pact gave more room for fiscal manoeuvre to states, but made it 
more difficult for ECOFIN to measure compliance. The German and French decision to 
allow a higher budget deficit and debts level, arguing that they remain sovereign 
countries, is an illustration of this case. 
 
The Spanish government’s position in the so-called “European semester” 2012 offers 
another illustration of sovereignty games. The European semester refers to a more 
integrated surveillance framework and governs the implementation of fiscal policies 
under the Stability and Growth Pact. Its aim is to strengthen economic governance and 
ensure budgetary discipline in the European Union. In the context of integrated 
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Guidelines outlined in National Reform Programmes, EMU member states develop plans 
for the implementation of structural reforms to ensure progress towards the agreed 
goals of the EU Strategy for Growth and Jobs ("Europe 2020"). In the negotiation of the 
2012 European semester with the Spanish government, the Spanish prime minister 
declared that given the difficulties of the country’s economy, Spain would not allow that 
the European Union to dictate its rules and its structural adjustment plans. Confronted 
with a legitimacy crisis at the domestic level, the Spanish prime minister used the 
reference to sovereignty at the EU level to reinforce its position at the domestic level 
and to argue in its favour at the European level. Thus, although member states sign 
agreements they use sovereignty discourses for reasons of legitimacy. This attitude is, 
indeed, similar to the analysis in terms of two level games’ (Putnam 1988), in which 
governments play on two levels and use the argument of their responsibility with regard 
to the domestic constituency in international negotiations. However, the difference here 
is linked to the main argument developed by governmental representatives: instead of 
specific policy arguments, data and expertise, state representatives refer to the general 
principle of sovereignty as a strategic tool.  
From a legal point of view, finally, scholars argue that the usage of sovereignty is less 
based on strategic or legitimation features, but on cognitive aspects. These cognitive 
aspects are long- term developments, as can be seen when studying Member states’ 
constitutional courts rulings. The German Constitutional court handed down a decision 
in June 2009 on a challenge to German ratification of the Lisbon Treaty of 2008. The 
Court found that such a ratification would not per se violate German basic law. Mac 
Amhlaigh (forthcoming) argues here that, similar to the German Constitutional Courts’ 
1993 decision, the authority in the judgment was ultimately framed by the German 
Constitution’s ‘openness’ to European integration. He states that ‘In the reconstruction 
of post-war Germany, and particularly in the drafting of the basic law, the previous 
unhappy experiences with popular sovereignty were suppressed in favour of a strong 
assertion of the rule of law and the supremacy of the basic law over the political process’ 
(Amhlaigh forthcoming, 12). This ruling shows the cognitive usage of sovereignty, 
embedded in a historical framework of understanding what sovereignty means in a 
specific national context. In France, the Constitutional Court has progressively accepted 
the European Court of Justice’s jurisprudence and slowly abolished legal instruments it 
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had created itself to resist European law. The most spectacular decision was the 
Constitutional Court’s  1989 Nicolo ruling in which recognised, for the first time, the 
supremacy of European law over national law.  
 
Thus, state sovereignty is used for two publics: a national and an international one. At 
the national level, the sovereignty is used for legitimation purposes; at the international 
level, it refers to strategic or cognitive usages. At the same time, however, these two 
usages are intimately linked. They are used at the same time by governmental actors, 
but refer to two different discursive arenas.  
 
It is precisely in these contexts that we see how sovereignty is constructed, through the 
interaction of diplomats playing a particular role, but at the same time adjusting to 
outside pressures. In the constructivist sense, sovereignty is understood as an historical 
concept and not as a timeless legal principle. It links authority, territory, population, and 
recognition in a unique way, and in a particular time (Biersteker and Weber 1996; 
Aalberts 2012). In order to understand this social interaction, it is necessary to analyse 
both the transformation of the concept and the carriers of its meanings, i.e. actors, be 
they public or private. In other words: ‘It may be that the ‘speech-act’ of sovereignty is 
more complex to perform in an era of globalization and constitutional pluralism, yet it 
remains an essential political tool in constituting the functional national and 
international legal orders in which power politics are played out’ (Gammeltoft-Hansen 
and Adler Nissen 2008: 7; Walker 2003: 19-25).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Contrary to the three perspectives presented in the first part of this article, the state and 
sovereignty remain very present in European integration processes. Sovereignty does 
not disappear through European integration, nor does it transform itself into something 
new, and thus does not need new conceptual tools or theories to capture its significance. 
Nor is it possible to simply ignore sovereignty, as do MLG approaches concentrating on 
the state as one actor amongst others.  
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Understanding sovereignty as an institutional variable which structures power relations 
(Walker 2007, Biersteker and Weber 1995, Sassen 1995) and allows states to play 
strategic, cognitive and legitimacy games helps us to go beyond the understanding of the 
EU as a quasi state, and thus the disappearance of state sovereignty through European 
integration. Sovereignty continues to be an essential value of political processes but 
becomes visible only through its usage. While this is a political fact since the Treaty of 
Westphalia, in the European Union, sovereignty becomes an important element to 
understand both policy-making processes and outcomes, which are increasingly based 
on the usage of sovereignty in order to block or to slow down integration processes.  
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